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THE ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSIBILITY  
OF THE REGIONALIZING ELECTRIC  
UTILITY INDUSTRY 
JOEL B. EISEN† 
Power transactions trading at lowest cost will eliminate certain envi-
ronmental and renewable resources, which trade above the market 
clearing power price, unless otherwise protected by government pol-
icy.1 
The invitation to this symposium prompted me to do some seri-
ous head scratching. Would I discuss whether “environmental regula-
tions currently act as a barrier to entry in energy markets and whether 
the current regime strikes the right balance between environmental 
protection and efficiency”?2 In this time of massive uncertainty over 
the future of “energy markets,” could environmental laws be the 
roadblock to progress? 
In my view and those of numerous others,3 progress toward 
wholesale and retail markets (“restructuring”) has slowed through 
poor design of the regulatory and technical infrastructure and the 
combination of California, Enron,4 the uncertain future of FERC’s 
Standard Market Design (“SMD”)5 and Wholesale Power Market 
Platform (“WPMP”)6 proposals, states grappling with “stranded 
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 1. Steven Ferrey, Sustainable Energy, Environmental Policy, and States’ Rights: Discerning 
the Energy Future Through the Eye of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 12 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 
507, 523 (2004). 
 2. Letter from Allison H. Ridder, Special Projects Editor, Duke Environmental Law and 
Policy Forum, to Joel B. Eisen 1 (June 17, 2004) (on file with Duke Environmental Law and 
Policy Forum). 
 3. See generally 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. (forthcoming 2005). 
 4. See generally ENRON: CORPORATE FIASCOES AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS (Nancy B. 
Rapoport and Bala G. Dharan eds., 2002). 
 5. Remedying Undue Discrimination Through Open Access Transmission Service and 
Standard Electricity Market Design, 67 Fed. Reg. 55,452 (FERC proposed Aug. 29, 2002, to be 
codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35). 
 6. FED’L ENERGY REG. COMM’N, WHOLESALE POWER MARKET PLATFORM WHITE 
PAPER (2003) available at http://www.ferc.gov/industries/electric/indus-act/smd/white_paper.pdf. 
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costs” and other transition issues, and complex problems of market 
structure and operation. Indeed, some of the same luminaries in the 
field who are participants in this Symposium will be contributing pa-
pers to a symposium early next year on “Realizing the Promise of 
Electric Deregulation.”7 
Even those who haven’t yet given up on restructuring don’t put 
much blame on environmental laws.8 But that hardly means that there 
aren’t important environmental considerations in restructuring. In 
this Article, I will address environmental issues in the context of our 
rapidly evolving understanding of “restructuring.” The market for 
electricity is fast becoming a series of regional marketplaces for 
wholesale transactions, operating on bid-based systems that move 
power at the lowest cost.9 There are plenty of states where power is 
still delivered as it has been for decades: by “bundled” service pro-
vided by vertically integrated utilities.10 However, the trend is toward 
regionalization, where independent entities control the transmission 
grid and play a major role in determining how power is delivered. 
These market participants, confusingly, have been known by a num-
ber of names and acronyms, though the most recent one is “regional 
transmission organizations” (“RTOs”).11 The trend toward regional 
 
 7. 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV supra, note 3. My own essay will be titled Regulatory Linear-
ity, Commerce Clause Brinksmanship, and Retrenchment in Electric Utility Restructuring. 
 8. Richard J. Pierce, Environmental Regulation, Energy & Market Entry, 15 DUKE 
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 167 (2005). In his upcoming essay, Realizing the Promise of Restructuring 
the Electricity Market, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV., supra note 3 (abstract available at SSRN Elec-
tronic Paper Collection, http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?abstract_id=585706 (last visited March 
25th, 2005)), Professor Pierce argues that “the major political impediment to completion of the 
restructuring process consists of a group of politically powerful electric utilities in the southeast 
and northwest who have consistently opposed restructuring because they prefer the comfortable 
and profitable life of an ineffectively-regulated monopolist to participation in a competitive 
market.” 
 9. See, e.g., D. Mitchell McFarland et al., Applicability of the Uniform Commercial Code 
to Sale of Electric Power in the Wholesale Power Marketing Context, 21 CORP. COUNS. REV. 251, 
256 (2002) (noting that, “Centralized power markets now exist in which suppliers may submit 
bids to sell to regional markets and various trading hubs have emerged across the country trad-
ing power on a bilateral basis.”) 
 10. U.S. Dept. of Energy, Energy Information Admin., Map and Status of State Electric 
Industry Restructuring Activity, available at 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/chg_str/restructure.pdf (last visited March 28, 2005) 
(map showing that half of the states have not begin to restructure); Joseph P. Tomain, 2002 En-
ergy Law Symposium: The Past and Future of Electricity Regulation, 32 ENVTL. L. 435, 438 
(2002). 
 11. RTOs evolved from “ISOs” (Independent System Operators) in FERC’s Order No. 
2000, Regional Transmission Organizations, 65 Fed. Reg. 809 (June 6, 2000) (codified at 18 
C.F.R. pt. 35). 
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marketplaces continues unabated, even in the face of uncertainty 
about FERC regulatory efforts.12 
Environmental laws are not nearly as important as other business 
considerations in their impact on utilities’ decisions to pool their as-
sets. That discussion centers largely on considerations that don’t have 
much to do with environmental laws: whether the profit motive is 
enough of an incentive for transmission firms to manage the grid 
properly, ensure reliability, or build new capacity. There is an impor-
tant set of environmental concerns in the transmission area involving 
the ongoing controversy over the siting of new transmission lines. As 
Professors Rossi and Pierce explain in depth in their articles, oppo-
nents of new projects can use state and local laws to delay or even 
stop new transmission lines.13 So for the moment I will focus on a dif-
ferent intersection of environmental laws and a regionalizing indus-
try: the impacts on generation of electricity. 
I. ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS’ INFLUENCE ON GENERATION 
The electricity system has three parts: generation, transmission 
and distribution,14 though the delineations among the three are be-
coming less clear.15 Would there be more generators pouring their 
power into the new regional markets but for environmental regula-
tors and their insistence that pollution be controlled? 
Undeniably, the environmental laws make it difficult for some 
potential entrants in the generation business. A nuclear power plant 
can take more than a decade to get from the drawing board to opera-
tion, and much of that time would be spent in mandated environ-
mental reviews.16 FERC has not seriously contemplated any new nu-
 
 12. See Greg Edwards, Va. Power Tells SCC of Regional Grid’s Cost; Utility Says Joining is 
a New Expense and Customers Who Will Benefit Should Pay, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, 
Oct. 27, 2004, at C-1. 
 13. Jim Rossi, Transmission Siting in Deregulated Wholesale Power Markets: The Cross-
Sound Cable As a Case Study of FERC’s Role Under Existing Law 15 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 
F. 315 (2005); Pierce, supra note 8. 
 14. See, e.g., Jeffery S. Dennis, Federalism, Electric Industry Restructuring, and the Dor-
mant Commerce Clause: Tampa Electric Co. v. Garcia and State Restrictions on the Development 
of Merchant Power Plants, 43 NAT. RESOURCES J. 615 (2003). Due to the high cost of establish-
ing new, duplicative facilities, there is little chance of a movement toward free, unfettered com-
petition in distribution. 
 15. See William Hogan, Market Power in Theory and Practice at 2, available at 
http://ksghome.harvard.edu/~whogan/powr0300.pdf (noting that “[t]he usual separation into 
generation, transmission, and distribution is insufficient.”) (March 17, 2000). 
 16. Joseph P. Tomain, Nuclear Futures, 15 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 221 (2005). 
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clear plants since before I began law school in 1982.17 Some, of course, 
might think of this as a salutary effect of environmental laws. Others 
point to the difficulties associated with getting state-of-the-art natural 
gas plants on line as evidence of a barrier to entry posed by the envi-
ronmental laws, and it would be hard to argue that environmental re-
views have not played a part in that situation.18 
Professor David Spence mentions a pervasive fear that existed at 
the outset of restructuring: that utilities operating dirtier coal-fired 
power plants in a deregulated environment could sell their output na-
tionwide, thus giving them an incentive to fire up antiquated plants 
and increase air pollution and adverse environmental effects.19 The 
utility industry has the doubly dubious distinction of being one of the 
nation’s most significant polluters and one of the most consistent 
avoiders, delayers, and subverters of enforcement.20 The loopholes, 
intransigence of utility companies, and only moderately successful en-
forcement record have allowed utilities to operate in the shadow of 
the law.21 Thus, it would be dangerous, frankly, to encourage utilities 
to emit more pollution into the air without regard for the environ-
mental consequences. 
Restructuring may or may not have encouraged more pollution; 
Professor Spence and others have some doubt about that.22 One rea-
son restructuring took place in the first instance was a flood of new 
 
 17. Id. 
 18. One example I am familiar with is the protracted battle over a proposal by Tractebel, a 
Houston-based energy company, to build a power plant near Leesburg, Virginia. Tractebel 
withdrew its application after running into considerable opposition from local residents and the 
public interest environmental group Piedmont Environmental Council. See Piedmont Environ-
mental Council, Power Plant Campaign, available at 
http://www.pecva.org/powerplants/tractebel.asp (last visited March 28, 2005); David Bradkey, 
Tractebel ends plan to build in Loudoun, Loudoun Easterner, Feb. 27, 2002, available at 
http://www.easterner.com/articles02/022702/content.htm. 
 19. David B. Spence, Coal-Fired Power in a Restructured Electricity Market, 15 DUKE 
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 187 (2005). See also NAT’L COUNCIL ON ELEC. POLICY, A 
COMPREHENSIVE VIEW OF U.S. ELECTRICITY RESTRUCTURING WITH POLICY OPTIONS FOR 
THE FUTURE 65, available at http://www.ncouncil.org/restruc.pdf (June 2003). 
 20. In a recent issue of this journal, a Vermont Law School professor states that utilities 
make up “an industry notorious for stonewalling air quality regulation.” Patrick Parenteau, 
Anything Industry Wants: Environmental Policy Under Bush II, 14 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 
363, 369 (2004). 
 21. See generally Joel B. Eisen, A Critique of the Regulations Revising the U.S. Clean Air 
Act’s New Source Review Program, 13th World Clean Air and Environmental Protection Con-
gress and Exhibition, London, United Kingdom (forthcoming Aug. 2004); Parenteau, supra note 
20, at 375-78 (discussing NSR “myths and realities”). 
 22. Spence, supra note 19. 
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generation entrants, spurred on by the Public Utility Regulatory Pol-
icy Act (“PURPA”) and Energy Policy Act of 1992 (“EPAct”), that 
prompted FERC, Congress, and state legislatures to consider the 
merits of industry-wide competition.23 A large number of natural gas 
plants have come on line in the past decade, though the trend slowed 
recently.24 If there has been any pervasive impact at all on new gen-
eration from environmental laws in restructuring, it may well have 
been the salutary effect of marginally encouraging the switch from 
dirtier fuels (principally coal) to relatively cleaner ones (principally 
natural gas) among new entrants, though market conditions for basic 
fuels are also important.25 
Of course, the primary focus on the environmental impacts of 
generation in a restructuring environment has been a nationwide de-
bate over regulation of utilities under the Clean Air Act (“CAA”). 
As others and I have pointed out, the CAA New Source Review pro-
gram has been a lightning rod of controversy and it is hard to imagine 
that anyone today would seriously contend that it has achieved the 
objective of controlling emissions from power plants.26 We have com-
pelling evidence, of course, that it has been a major failure.27 While it 
might be worth discussing replacing the existing system of regulation 
in whole or part with a “second generation” technique such as a car-
bon tax or cap and trade system,28 this raises a complex set of issues 
that would take us well beyond the focus of this Symposium. 
II. “ENVIRONMENTAL” LAWS  
PROMOTING RENEWABLE RESOURCES 
I would like to focus on the “barrier to entry” question in an-
other context, namely, governmental policies that promote market 
 
 23. Donald F. Santa, Jr. & Clifford S. Sikora, Open Access and Transition Costs: Will the 
Electric Industry Transition Track the Natural Gas Industry Restructuring?, 25 Energy L.J. 113, 
128 (2004). 
 24. See Justin M. Nesbit, Commerce Clause Implications of Massachusetts’ Attempt to Limit 
the Importation of “Dirty” Power in the Looming Competitive Retail Market for Electricity Gen-
eration, 38 B.C.L. Rev. 811, 816-17 (1997) (crediting for restructuring the flood of new wholesale 
generators resulting from PURPA and EPAct). 
 25. Id. 
 26. See Deepa Varadarajan, Billboards and Big Utilities: Borrowing Land-Use Concepts to 
Regulate “Nonconforming” Sources Under the Clean Air Act, 112 Yale L.J. 2553, 2577 (2003) 
(noting the deficiencies of New Source Review in raising standards for older sources). 
 27. See TOMAIN, supra note 16. See also supra text accompanying note 18. 
 28. One example is the Bush Administration’s controversial “Clear Skies Initiative.” See 
Clear Skies, available at http://www.epa.gov/clearskies/ (last visited March 28, 2005). 
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entry of renewable resources. In a regional electricity marketplace, 
the market maker, not the government, presumably decides what 
electricity gets made and to whom it is sold. Thus, critics have force-
fully suggested for over a decade that regulatory devices introducing 
non-market mechanisms conflict with the fundamental premise of de-
regulation, whether they are premised on environmental or any other 
considerations.29 
Speaking of a barrier to entry in this context is illuminating, 
though probably not in the sense opponents of environmental 
mechanisms have in mind. The most common “barrier” is that faced 
by firms that use renewable resources to generate electricity. Wind 
power is considered too intermittent to bring online; solar power is 
not cost-effective, etc.30 A large array of tools and techniques exist to 
promote renewable resources. These environmental mechanisms—
the “avoided cost” provision of PURPA or the production tax credit 
for electricity generated from renewable resources, among others31—
endeavor to encourage entrants, not deter them. 
There are numerous reasons to promote environmentally 
friendly generation in a restructuring environment. It would reduce 
air pollution; even assuming for the moment that traditional envi-
ronmental regulation could internalize the harmful effects of air pol-
lution from fossil fuel-fired plants, we have not accounted for poten-
tial advantages of renewable resources that produce no pollution at 
all. Generating electricity from renewable resources would improve 
our profile of greenhouse gas emissions.32 There are other advantages 
 
 29. See, e.g., Bernard S. Black & Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Choice Between Markets and 
Central Planning in Regulating the U.S. Electric Industry, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1341 (1993) (argu-
ing that heavy governmental intervention that has characterized energy policy since inception is 
no longer viable); Jerry Taylor & Peter VanDoren, Cato Institute Policy Analysis No. 422, 
Evaluating the Case for Renewable Energy: Is Government Support Warranted?, available at 
http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-422es.html (Jan. 10, 2002) (arguing that rationales for subsidies 
promoting renewable energy are without sound economic basis). 
 30. See Kathleen C. Reilly, Global Benefits Versus Local Concerns: The Need for a Bird’s 
Eye View of Nuclear Energy, 70 IND. L.J. 679, 699 (1995) (noting that many experts believe that 
solar and wind power are unworkable). 
 31. See James W. Moeller, Of Credits and Quotas: Federal Tax Incentives for Renewal Re-
sources, State Renewable Portfolio Standards, and the Evolution of Proposals for a Federal Re-
newable Portfolio Standard, 15 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. J. 69, 72-78, 89 (2004) (explaining the in-
tricacies of the production tax credit for electric power generated from renewable resources). 
See also Pub. L. No. 102-486, § 1914(a), 106 Stat. 2776, 3020 (codified at 26 U.S.C. §45(c)(1992)). 
 32. See, e.g., Union of Concerned Scientists, Electricity Restructuring, available at 
http://www.ucsusa.org/clean_energy/renewable_energy/page.cfm?pageID=92 (last visited March 
28, 2005) (noting that “[e]lectricity generation is the source of 36% of the carbon dioxide con-
tributing to global warming”). 
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stemming from the fact that these facilities tend to be more decentral-
ized than large conventional power plants. They reduce the risk of 
terrorism-related disruption of the electricity supply.33 By being de-
centralized they also introduce a diversity in supply that might help 
alleviate future shortages. 
Thus, there seems to be an important role for environmental 
mechanisms in a competitive environment. Some would disagree, of-
ten emphatically. In 1993, Professor Richard Pierce, a participant in 
this Symposium, opposed ongoing efforts to integrate environmental 
considerations in electricity restructuring through such devices as sub-
sidies for energy-efficiency investments.34 At the time he saw two 
competing revolutionary armies: swashbuckling free marketers at-
tempting to make inroads in the Stalinist citadels of the electric utility 
industry (who already had the proverbial nose under the camel’s tent 
with the pro-competitive provisions of PURPA and the EPAct) and 
environmental advocates who were trying to force their agenda 
through anti-competitive behavior.35 
Professor Pierce’s comments in 1993 reflected an important real-
ity. As things stood then—and, as I will demonstrate, now—those try-
ing to make electricity more environmentally friendly and those try-
ing to make it more competitive could not easily coexist, if at all. Any 
battle over a renewable portfolio standard or other “environmental” 
provision pits crusaders for change (different kinds of change, to be 
sure), each of whom has the fervent conviction that they are right, 
against one another. It is a recipe for perpetual tension. 
Dean Joseph Tomain, another of our Symposium participants, 
has observed a fundamental disconnect between the “energy” world 
and the “environmental” world.36 This is not surprising. Energy policy 
is premised on developing and nurturing reliable sources of power to 
accommodate growth and development; Environmental policy is 
premised on preserving resources, and, most importantly, forcing de-
cision makers to account for the full social cost of their actions. 
 
 33. Ferrey, supra note 1, at 518. 
 34. See Black & Pierce, supra note 29, at 1354 (arguing that “negawatt acquisition pro-
grams,” in which utilities subsidize investments by their customers that decrease customers’ 
electricity consumption, are generally not cost-effective and produce minimal environmental 
gains). 
 35. Id. at 1361. 
 36. Joseph P. Tomain, 2002 Energy Law Symposium: The Past and Future of Electricity 
Regulation, 32 ENVTL. L. 435, 465-68 (2002). 
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That has not deterred lawmakers from trying to make the indus-
try more environmentally sensitive. In a recent article, my co-panelist 
Steven Ferrey listed the following techniques: 
1. System Benefits Charge/Renewable Trust Fund (a “tax or 
surcharge mechanism for collecting funds from electric con-
sumers, the proceeds of which could then support a range of 
[environmentally-friendly] activities”); 
2. Renewable resource portfolio requirements; 
3. Siting reviews of new generation capacity (to interject an en-
vironmental component in siting reviews); 
4. “Green” electricity pricing; 
5. Promotional ratemaking policies (including, for example, net 
metering); 
6. Emission trading; 
7. Emission taxes; 
8. “Cleancos” (stand-alone companies promoting the commer-
cialization of environmental technologies); and 
9. Efficiency standards.37 
Some of these are in effect (renewable portfolio standards)38; Some of 
these only exist in the realm of the hypothetical (emission taxes).39 
This limited progress should surprise no one familiar with Dean To-
main’s observation. There is an outright schism on the vital question 
of whether environmental mechanisms should be employed at all in a 
restructuring industry. One’s position depends almost entirely on 
one’s initial assumptions. The environmental community takes it as a 
given that promoting renewable resources in restructuring is neces-
sary. Professor Ferrey, for example, devotes considerable thought to 
assessing the likely effectiveness of these environmental mecha-
nisms.40 
To free marketers, competition is what matters, and environ-
mental mechanisms are odious to it. Professor Pierce’s critique of 
them in 1993 was especially deft.41 He acknowledged the externalities 
of power generation, but nevertheless concluded that environmental 
 
 37. Ferrey, supra note 1, at 524 – 540. 
 38. See id. at 646 – 47 (noting that many states have adopted renewable resource portfolio 
requirements as part of their electricity restructuring and deregulation statutes). 
 39. See id. at 537 – 38 (explaining how an emissions tax could allocate the cost of residual 
pollution damages from their sources). 
 40. See generally id. 
 41. BLACK & PIERCE, supra note 29. 
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mechanisms designed to internalize them were unwarranted as a form 
of governmental intrusion in the market. He claimed other environ-
mental regulation, specifically the CAA’s system of air pollution con-
trols, would take care of the negative impacts of power generation.42 
This might have made sense in 1993 but cannot be considered a de-
finitive proposition today in light of the controversies of the past ten 
years, given the considerable shortcomings of the current CAA regu-
lation system. If second generation techniques such as cap-and-trade 
systems found even wider use in the CAA environment, Professor 
Pierce might have a stronger argument. 
III. ENVIRONMENTAL MECHANISMS IN A REGIONAL MARKET 
Defenders of environmental mechanisms have to come to grips 
with a simple and compelling reality: the new ethic in the industry is 
competition on a regional scale, not regulation. In the new utility in-
dustry, cost considerations are paramount. There is no better evi-
dence of this than the impact of the transition to competition on 
planning and demand-side management (“DSM”) programs. If utili-
ties were to compete, there was no reason to saddle them with re-
sponsibility for these environmental programs, which would pre-
sumably be taken over by new entrants into the market. The 
predictable result was a dramatic drop in DSM and integrated re-
source planning programs.43 Between 1993 and 1997, power compa-
nies discarded energy efficiency programs as anti-competitive, and in-
vestment in them fell by over 50% nationwide.44 
Acknowledging the ascendancy of competition based on cost, to 
what extent should environmental incentives be retained and for what 
reasons? Viewing the situation through the lens of pure competition, 
these incentives flunk the test of market friendliness. A production 
tax credit gives a substantial boost to one type of producer (currently, 
1.8¢/kWh45) that others do not receive. This is so un-market-like that 
Adam Smith would roll over in his grave. As noted above, Professor 
Pierce also argues that mechanisms relying on subsidies, unlike taxes 
on polluters, tilt the playing field without even attempting to remedy 
 
 42. Id. at 1394 – 97. 
 43. NAT’L COUNCIL ON ELEC. POLICY, supra note 19, at 45. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Moeller, supra note 31, at 90. 
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the underlying problem: the externalities of power generation.46 To an 
economist, this is inexcusable. 
But these arguments presuppose an ideal that does not exist: an 
ethic of perfect competition. The reality on the ground is not yet and 
cannot yet be so. Governmental intervention is a major component of 
the advance toward competition, not its antithesis. And, critically, 
that intervention already subsidizes one group: incumbent utilities 
that have successfully argued for recouping their “stranded costs” 
(costs incurred in a regulated universe that they might not recover in 
a competitive environment). In my state of Virginia, for example, any 
competitor—including, of course, a “green” generator—that wishes 
to use the transmission lines of an incumbent utility will pay a “com-
petitive transition” (or “wires”) charge to that utility.47 Of course, that 
utility does not charge its customers the wires charge. With any new 
entrant starting out at a competitive disadvantage, there are few of 
them in the Virginia retail market. If that is not a barrier to entry, I 
don’t know what is. 
Environmental incentives should not be subordinated to a com-
petition ethic until there is true “deregulation,” not “restructuring.” 
The difference is hardly one of mere semantics. In this hybrid system, 
there is little hard knowledge about what competition will bring, and 
lots of lacunae, which force arguments to be made anew in state and 
federal fora. The ideal of competition is years away. Market design 
still has a long way to go before we have seamless, robust national 
electricity markets. Until market monitoring can be done effectively, 
which is at best debatable, it is hard to argue that open access for all 
power generators on equal terms is achieved in practice. Transmission 
asset owners still wield market power, which they can still use to deter 
generation entrants. That is the barrier to entry we should be discuss-
ing; until there is true divestiture of the transmission infrastructure, 
there will not be true deregulation of the industry. Hence, of course, 
“restructuring.” 
IV. HOW TO JUDGE UNDER INSTITUTIONAL UNCERTAINTY 
Restructuring completely changes the nature of the electricity 
transaction. RTOs operate regional markets designed to provide their 
 
 46. BLACK & PIERCE, supra note 29, at 1369 – 70. 
 47. See VA. STAT. ANN. § 56-583 (2004) (describing the “wires charge”). 
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customers with electricity at the lowest cost.48 FERC’s Standard Mar-
ket Design proposal adopted a variant of the “locational marginal 
pricing” (“LMP”) model popularized by Harvard economics profes-
sor William Hogan and used by the PJM Interconnection RTO.49 An 
LMP-based system can be extremely sophisticated (for example, it 
can be split into day-ahead and spot markets), but its core principle is 
quite simple: the marginal cost of moving electricity through each 
node on the regional system reflects market conditions at that node.50 
At any given moment, a renewable plant might not be the least ex-
pensive unit to dispatch on the regional system, for any of a variety of 
reasons. As Professor Ferrey notes, “renewable technologies, because 
of their unreliability, may be barred from bidding power to a power 
exchange, . . . [or] may not emerge from a spot power pool system 
that dispatches generation to operate based on least cost—although 
many renewable technologies do have low marginal operating costs, if 
not low capital costs.”51 
Where free marketers see opportunity from institutional change, 
environmentalists see danger.52 There are lots of uncertainties about 
how these new electricity markets will operate. Of course, the shifting 
sands of jurisdiction have an enormous impact. The long-established 
distinction between sales at “wholesale” (regulated by the federal 
government) and “retail” (regulated by the states) has been, of 
course, the subject of considerable turmoil and controversy, not 
ended at all by a Supreme Court decision on the matter.53 As I write 
this article, for example, there is an ongoing debate in Virginia about 
whether the state can regulate the extent to which an incumbent util-
 
 48. See Hogan, supra note 15, at 5 – 7; Ferrey, supra note 1, at 634 – 35 (“This entity [the 
regional system operator] may be quasi-public, in that it has voluntary rules for generating unit 
dispatch and ramping. These rules can dispatch on a variety of protocols—essentially deter-
mined by the system operating rules and the related computer dispatch programs that drive and 
control the system.”). 
 49. See Hogan, supra note 15. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Ferrey, supra note 1, at 635; see also NAT’L COUNCIL ON ELEC. POLICY, supra note 19, 
at 65. 
 52. See, e.g., Environmental Public Interest Organization Comments on the Joint Petition 
for Declaratory Order Regarding the Creation of a Northeast Regional Transmission 
Organization, FERC Docket No. RT02-3-000, available at 
http://nedri.raabassociates.org/Articles/Final%20Filed%20 
Envir%20Comments%20on%20NERTO%2011-8-02.doc (Last visited March 28, 2005) 
(hereinafter NERTO Environmental Comments) (outlining steps that the proposed NERTO 
should take to incorporate environmental considerations in decisions). 
 53. See, e.g., Tomain, supra note 36, at 462 (“[t]he allocation of political authority is an 
open issue.”). 
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ity can recover the costs it incurs in joining an RTO. Not surprisingly, 
the vanguard of litigation on the jurisdictional question was occupied 
in large part by state public utility commissions concerned they would 
lose traditional regulatory authority if their utilities joined RTOs.54 In 
my home state of Virginia, this led to years of wrangling among the 
utilities, state regulators, state legislators, and corporate and con-
sumer groups about not only whether the utilities should join RTOs 
but who was empowered to make those basic decisions.55 
In the end, RTOs stand largely outside the purview of state pub-
lic utility commissions, but are related to them in the sense that 
wholesale transactions eventually lead to retail sales. As they grow, 
this unique split of authority has led to uncertainty about institutional 
leadership on many issues relating to the operation of these regional 
marketplaces. Still, it seems inevitable that the future belongs to 
RTOs or RTO-like markets, and the loss of regulatory jurisdiction 
will cut in one direction: states ceding their traditional jurisdiction to 
the federal government. In the new electricity market, there will be a 
“larger share of wholesale transactions that will become federally, 
rather than state, regulated.”56 The federal government, then, has a 
larger role to play in making the industry environmentally sensitive. 
FERC could require RTOs to incorporate environmental values in 
pricing decisions, but it has not done so.57 Nor has Congress, which 
has been slow to take to the notion of a federal renewable portfolio 
standard.58 
 
 54. Eisen, Regulatory Linearity, supra note 7 (describing as an example the litigation in-
volving the utility American Electric Power and its attempts to join the PJM RTO). 
 55. In an upcoming article, Professor Pierce blames this sort of tactic for stopping progress 
toward restructuring. See supra text accompanying note 13. 
 56. Ferrey, supra note 1, at 636. 
 57. Id. at 619 (“For renewables, FERC has not shown any inclination to grant a preferen-
tial price or rate for power procured from renewable resources.”). 
 58. Early versions of House Bill 6, the omnibus energy bill, would have created a federal 
renewable portfolio standard, gradually increasing to 20% of power generated from renewables. 
H.R. 6, 108th Cong. (2003). The RPS was left out of the final bill, which failed to become law in 
any event. See E&E Publ’g, The 108th Congress Energy Bill, available at 
http://www.eenews.net/sr_eb108.htm (last visited Feb. 3, 2005). For a good description of how 
the RPS wound up on the legislative cutting-room floor, see Stephen Polasky, Electricity Re-
structuring and the Environment, in PAINTING THE WHITE HOUSE GREEN: RATIONALIZING 
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY INSIDE THE EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT 145 – 47 (Ran-
dall Lutter & Jason F. Shogren eds., 2004). 
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V. WHAT SHOULD (AND CAN) STATES DO? 
The states, fortunately, have not stood still. What we should be 
doing, then, is discussing what role states’ environmental mechanisms 
should play in a partially deregulated market, where full competition 
is unlikely to occur for a while. For years to come we will have the 
transitional conditions that exist now, with regional marketplaces 
growing in number and scope and involving new players with un-
proven track records. 
One could say the best response is to do nothing. In this view, if 
it is in the best interest of the market, environmentally friendly firms 
will prosper. This ignores the barriers to entry facing firms that would 
provide electricity generated from renewable resources to regional 
marketplaces. Moreover, it is not as if one set of players (environ-
mental advocates, free marketers) has an entrenched position in this 
discussion; Instead, both are scrambling to adjust to and have their 
concerns addressed through continued governmental regulation in a 
rapidly changing environment. A real problem, then, is that of mak-
ing sure environmental concerns do not fall into a lacuna and vanish. 
As the quote at the beginning of this article makes clear, genera-
tors using renewable resources are generally not price competitive 
now if the sole focus is on costs.59 So the states’ actions should reflect 
a core principle that generators using renewable resources bring a 
wealth of benefits to the table that cannot be quantified solely by re-
gional protocols for dispatching least-cost resources. States should 
address this potential failure of the market (the narrow focus on cost 
as reflected in current bids), and recognize that renewable energy fa-
cilities face the true barriers to entry. 
Could a state directly influence the regional market? One of the 
most obvious and visible means to do so is a renewable portfolio 
standard (“RPS”). In its typical form, State X enacts a law that re-
quires a certain percentage of power sold within the state by its utili-
ties to be generated from renewable resources.60 At present, fourteen 
 
 59. This leads opponents to attack RPS as costly, without acknowledging the 
environmental benefits of electricity generated using renewable resources. See, e.g., Heritage 
Foundation, The Senate-Passed Energy Bill Will Hurt Consumers, available at 
http://www.heritage.org/Research/Energyand Environment/BG1590.cfm (last visited March 28, 
2005) (criticizing the Senate-passed RPS for increasing electricity costs to consumers). 
 60. See, e.g., Suedeen Kelly, NM PRC Issues New Proposal for Renewable Portfolio Stan-
dard (RPS), available at http://www.modrall.com/articles/article_110.html (2002) (describing the 
proposed RPS in New Mexico). Suedeen Kelly is an attorney who later became FERC Commis-
sioner, and is also a participant in this Symposium. 
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states have some form of RPS.61 Numerous design issues are ad-
dressed differently in different states: what the percentage is (and 
how it is set); which utilities are covered; which renewable resources 
qualify; and so forth.62 
An RPS is a market-friendly mechanism; In Professor Ferrey’s 
words, “there is no government subsidy of any technology or project, 
[and] the market dictates what renewable technologies and projects 
are actually successful based on competition . . . .”63 An RPS does not 
tax or subsidize any particular technology (thus avoiding the ineffi-
ciency of subsidies described above). It does not force a utility to use 
any specific technology or, for that matter, to even generate power 
with renewable resources. In many states, the utility can purchase cer-
tificates called “renewable energy certificates” (“RECs”) from other 
generators instead of generating the power itself.64 The sale of RECs 
by renewable suppliers can help make their power competitive on an 
overall basis with power generated by fossil fuels. The power itself is 
more expensive, and so selling it into a regional market might be un-
economic, but the separate sale of RECs makes up the difference (at 
least in theory). 
VI. WHAT CAN STATES DO (THE JURISDICTIONAL QUESTION)? 
This last point requires us to consider how an RPS overlaps with 
a regional marketplace. Even though it is a state standard, the RPS 
“does not subsidize any particular . . . locus,”65 so generation can take 
place anywhere. In fact, a state cannot allow only power generated 
and sold within the state by in-state utilities to counts toward the re-
newables requirement. If it did so the RPS would clearly run afoul of 
the dormant commerce clause.66 So in many cases, power generated 
by renewables will come from out-of-state sources. Many utilities sub-
 
 61. The Database of State Incentives for Renewable Energy (DSIRE) maintains a list of 
state incentives for renewable energy, including renewable portfolio standards. See 
http://www.dsireusa.org (last visited March 28, 2005). 
 62. NAT’L COUNCIL ON ELEC. POLICY, supra note 19, at 47 – 48. 
 63. Ferrey, supra note 1, at 531. 
 64. See U.S. Dept. of Energy, Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy, Renewable 
Energy Certificates: Retail Certificate Products, available at 
http://www.eere.energy.gov/greenpower/ markets/certificates.shtml?page=1 (last visited March 
28, 2005). The European clearinghouse for RECs is the Renewable Energy Certificate System 
(RECS). See http://www.recs.org (last visited March 28, 2005). 
 65. Ferrey, supra note 1, at 531. 
 66. Dennis, supra note 14, at 641 – 42 (listing the factors courts would use to invalidate this 
“economic protectionism”). 
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ject to a RPS also belong to an RTO into which they sell power.67 
Keep in mind that electricity flows continuously throughout the large 
regional grids like the proverbial water in the swimming pool, so it is 
generated, flows onto the grid, joins other power, then is transmitted 
to a retail seller (“load-serving entity” or “LSE,” in utility parlance) 
at the other end of the transaction.68 That is, it flows throughout the 
region. 
Thus, state mandates have to mesh with the regional market-
places in two senses: legally (fitting the new jurisdictional contours) 
and operationally (addressing underlying market dynamics while al-
lowing RTOs to integrate the mechanism functionally into their mar-
ket-making activities). With respect to the jurisdictional question, 
states retain their traditional right to regulate retail activities within 
the state, including such matters as distribution companies’ conduct.69 
But a state cannot “reach back ‘upstream’”70 to regulate a wholesale 
transaction, for example, by controlling an RTO’s pricing policy, even 
if it believed it needed to do so in the name of environmental protec-
tion. As many have shown, there are Constitutional and statutory 
problems with this.71 
Is the requirement of a percentage of power generated from re-
newables a decision over which State X has jurisdiction, because it is 
regulating the operations of a utility doing business in the state? Or is 
it an impermissible restriction on wholesale transactions, because it is 
constraining the RTO’s ability to decide which power is sold through-
out a region? This is an open question; No court to date has tackled 
 
 67. Connecticut’s RPS, for instance, allows utilities to count toward the standard power 
they purchase from qualifying renewable energy sources “within the jurisdiction of the regional 
independent system operator,” in this case ISO-New England. See DSIRE, Connecticut Incen-
tives for Renewable Energy, available at 
http://www.dsireusa.org/library/includes/map2.cfm?CurrentPageID=1&State=CT (last visited 
March 28, 2005). 
 68. This is, of course, a very simplistic description of a very complex relationship. For ex-
ample, PJM offers a course called “Load Serving Entity 201” that describes the complex rela-
tionship between the regional market and the load serving entity. Of particular interest is the 
lengthy list of “Requirements of an LSE,” which describes the full range of interactions between 
the LSE and PJM. See Requirements of an LSE, available at 
http://www.pjm.com/services/courses/downloads/20040726-item3-requirements-of-an-lse.pdf 
(last visited March 28, 2005). 
 69. See, e.g., Ferrey, supra note 1, at 637. 
 70. Id. at 637. 
 71. See, e.g., NAT’L COUNCIL ON ELEC. POLICY, supra note 19, at 49; Dennis, supra note 
14; Ferrey, supra note 1; see generally Kirsten H. Engel, The Dormant Commerce Clause Threat 
to Market-Based Environmental Regulation: The Case of Electricity Deregulation, 26 ECOLOGY 
L.Q. 243 (1999). 
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the intersection of state and federal jurisdiction in the context of a re-
newable portfolio standard.72 
The Federal Power Act, the touchstone of federal power over 
the industry, defines electric energy transmitted in interstate com-
merce as energy “transmitted from a State and consumed at any point 
outside thereof . . . .”73 This language “has consistently been found to 
mean that FERC has jurisdiction when the system is interconnected 
and capable of transmitting energy across the state boundary, even 
though the contracting parties are in fact in one state. Similarly, the 
transmission of power over a utility transmission grid used in inter-
state commerce is subject to FERC jurisdiction, even when all parties 
to the transaction are located within the same state.”74 Therefore, 
FERC has jurisdiction over the transmission facilities of an RTO, as 
they are clearly used in interstate commerce. 
However, that does not end the matter. States have not been 
shut completely out of the jurisdictional mix, and retain their tradi-
tional authority over intrastate matters. This allows them to regulate 
such matters as siting, feasibility determinations, plant operational 
characteristics, and environmental compliance. In turn, this leads Pro-
fessor Ferrey to conclude that if an RPS does not limit where the 
power is generated, it would not pose an impermissible burden on in-
terstate commerce.75 
VII. DESIGNING A REGIONAL SYSTEM TO ACCOUNT  
FOR A STATE RPS (OR, PERHAPS, A REGIONAL RPS) 
How should a regional market be structured to allow a utility to 
meet the relevant state RPS? 76 The operational aspects of this inquiry 
are complex. It is impossible to “tag” a unit of electricity, so an LSE 
cannot determine at any given moment whether the electricity it just 
delivered was generated by a nuclear plant or a wind farm. Nor can 
the RTO know the environmental attributes of the power it is trans-
mitting about the grid, unless it has some form of accounting. And 
then there’s the matter of the reckoning: how does the state know at 
the end of the year that the utility has complied with the RPS? 
 
 72. Ferrey, supra note 1, at 645. 
 73. 16 U.S.C. § 824(c) (2000). 
 74. Steven Ferrey, Nothing But Net: Renewable Energy and the Environment, Midamerican 
Legal Fictions, and Supremacy Doctrine, 14 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 1, 115 – 16 (2003) 
(hereinafter Ferrey, Nothing But Net). 
 75. Id. at 115 – 16. 
 76. DSIRE, supra note 67. 
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Tracking the attributes of a generator thus becomes paramount 
in a regional system that seeks to promote utility compliance with a 
state RPS.77 Some regions have made considerable progress toward 
establishing a market for the attributes of electricity wholly separate 
and independent from that for the electricity itself. The ISO-New 
England RTO uses a Geographic Information System (“GIS”) to 
track generator information.78 PJM Interconnection, the large RTO in 
the Mid-Atlantic region, has developed a Generator Attribute Track-
ing System (“GATS” ) with a sophisticated design.79 In it, each gen-
erator would have an account into which certificates would be depos-
ited as electricity was generated. These certificates would contain 
relevant data about the nature of the generation (e.g., the fuel used). 
LSEs would also have GATS accounts, and they would obtain certifi-
cates from PJM generators, who would have to sell or transfer certifi-
cates to them. At the end of the year, if the LSEs did not have certifi-
cates that matched their load served, they would be allocated them 
from a “residual mix” pool of unsold and unused certificates.80 Once 
all certificates had been allocated reports could be generated to de-
termine whether LSEs met the RPS requirements.81 
As PJM acknowledges, there are numerous reasons why this type 
of system should be implemented on a regional basis, foremost 
among them, of course, being that the market for electricity is quickly 
becoming regional.82 The PJM GATS might work well in practice, as 
would a similar system being planned for NYISO.83 The RTO (PJM) 
generates information, which the LSEs then in turn use to convince 
their individual state regulators that they meet the RPS (which of 
course differs from state to state). 
 
 77. NERTO Environmental Comments, supra note 52 (noting that the design of a “super-
RTO” proposed for the Northeast should incorporate this type of system). 
 78. ISO New England, Generator Information Systems, available at http://www.iso-ne.com/ 
committees/generator_information_systems (last visited April 4, 2005). 
 79. See PJM Generator Attributes Tracking Sys. Working Group, GATS Concept (March 
17, 2004), available at http://www.pjm.com/committees/working-
groups/gats/download/20040401-draft-concept-paper.pdf. 
 80. Id. at 5 – 6. 
 81. Id. at 6 – 7. 
 82. Id. at 1. 
 83. See Initial Comments of the New York Independent System Operator at 7, New York 
Pub. Serv. Comm’n Case 03-E-0188 (2003), available at 
http://www.nyiso.com/services/documents/ filings/sept_2003/nyiso_intl_cmmnts_rps_9_29_03.pdf 
(last visited Feb. 28, 2005) (stating that, “The NYISO supports the development of a similar 
system in New York and is working informally with Market Participants and vendors . . . to 
attempt to develop the scope of a GATS requirement.”). 
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A recent technical assistance report on New Jersey’s develop-
ment of an RPS shows how complex the issues in this process can be. 
Among other focuses of the report were the relationship between the 
state RPS and the “much larger electricity market” (in this case, 
PJM).84 The report recommended that New Jersey support the PJM 
GATS program, and considered the following additional issues: 
1. What power should count toward the RPS? As noted above, 
Constitutional problems would arise if a state determined 
that only in-state power would count. But could a state set 
any limitations on power generated too remotely from the 
state?85 Would it have to credit wind power generated in 
North Dakota, for example?86 Would this issue have to be re-
visited if, as is the case at present, the regional market con-
tinued to expand? 
2. If it is desirable that only power from “new” renewable facili-
ties counts toward the RPS, how should that be defined?87 
3. If other states in the region adopt RPS’s, would that lead to-
ward a possible shortage of REC’s, and what would be done 
to address this shortage? Should a state consider altering its 
RPS in light of the actions of neighboring states that are also 
part of the regional market?88 
4. If a shortage of credits persisted, could a utility satisfy its re-
quirement through some sort of alternative mechanism such 
as a payment into a state’s clean energy fund, or would this 
have the effect of discouraging the market for green power?89 
5. Should the state have its own accounting system for REC’s or 
should it simply rely on the regional one?90 
Given that these regional markets are just getting underway in many 
places, now is the time to discuss this important set of issues. Some 
have even suggested converting the existing patchwork of state re-
newable portfolio standards to a smaller number of “regional portfo-
 
 84. NAT’L COUNCIL ON ELEC. POLICY, REG’L ASSISTANCE PROJECT, TECHNICAL 
ASSISTANCE FOR THE NEW JERSEY RENEWABLE ENERGY TASK FORCE 4 – 5, available at 
http://www.ncouncil.org/ rap.pdf (2003). 
 85. See id. at 4. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. The New Jersey report recommended that power count only from those renewable 
facilities outside the PJM market that commenced construction on or after January 1, 2003. 
 88. Id at 5. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id.at 6. 
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lio standards.”91 It would require either voluntary agreement or fed-
eral regulation to implement a solution of this sort, so it is not surpris-
ing that the discussion to date involves cooperation between states 
and regional markets. On the other hand, resolving all of these issues 
on a regional basis may well be the kind of strategy that should be 
employed to ensure environmental friendliness in an industry that is, 
as noted above, fast becoming regional. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
A former White House staffer and restructuring veteran recently 
opined that, “[a]t first glance, deregulation issues do not seem to be 
particularly relevant for environmental policy.”92 That’s because on 
the surface, restructuring seems to be all about economics, and little 
else. Still, environmental considerations are important, and the real 
issue is to what extent they are protected (not thought of as an impo-
sition) during this tectonic upheaval in the industry. Thus, I would ask 
whether we should utilize laws we would describe as environmental, 
for lack of a better term, to help entrants who will generate power us-
ing renewable resources. 
Restructuring is nothing short of a complete reordering of the 
famously staid electric utility industry. And, like other changes it in-
troduces a host of uncertainty. The raison d’etre of restructuring is to 
bring about free market-like competition in the industry. As a coun-
terpoint to the inefficient regulatory regime of the past this may well 
make sense, although the jury is still out and the promise of restruc-
turing has not yet been fully capitalized upon in practice. But the goal 
of restructuring is to allow free-wheeling (pardon the pun) competi-
tion without guarantees except that it will lower costs for end users of 
electricity. Modern environmental regulation exists precisely because 
concerned individuals, legislatures and judges thought it essential that 
in these sorts of situations competitors should be reined in to control 
environmental risks. In all such dynamics the quest of responsible en-
vironmental advocates is not to deny that a market mechanism can 
work, but to make sure that the market mechanism captures the full 
social cost of production in the price of electricity. 
 
 91. Regulators in New England have proposed that the entire region develop a collective 
portfolio standard with tradable credits. See DSIRE, Maine Incentives for Renewable Energy, 
available at 
http://www.dsireusa.org/library/includes/incentive2.cfm?Incentive_Code=ME01R&state=ME&
CurrentPageID=1 (last visited March 28, 2005). 
 92. Polasky, supra note 58, at 141. 
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To categorize all environmental mechanisms as inefficient is to 
deny the fundamental institutional responsibility of regional players 
in electricity restructuring to ensure that environmental considera-
tions survive the transition to competition. At the regional level, 
promising initiatives are already underway to support market-friendly 
mechanisms such as renewable portfolio standards. Still, there is a 
long way to go before the states’ mandates and the new regional mar-
kets are effectively harmonized. 
